Speech of Hon. Stephen A. Douglas on the "Measures of adjustment", delivered in the City Hall, Chicago, October 23, 1850

CO

Douglas, Stephen Arnold

Speech of Hon. Stephen A. Douglas

SPEECH

OP

HON. STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS,

ON THE

MEASURES OF ADJUSTMENT,

DELIVERED IN THE CITY HALL, CHICAGO, OCTOBER 23, 1850.

WASHINGTON:

GIDEON & CO., PRINTERS.
1851.

J

SPEECH

OP

HON, STEPHEN A, DOUGLAS,

ON THE

MEASURES OF ADJUSTMENT,

DELIVERED IN THE VjjTY HALL, CHICAGO, OCTOCER 23, 1850.

WASHINGTON:

GIDEON & Cp| PRINTERS,
1851.

\

968

PREFACE.

The following speech was made under peculiar circumstances. The two Senators from
Illinois had sustained all the measures of adjustment. Upon his return home, Mr. Dougla*
found that the provisions of the Fugitive bill had been so grossly misrepresented, that
public opinion was loud and fierce in its condemnation. The common council of the
city of Chicago, in their official capacity, passed resolutions denouncing the law as a violation
of the Constitution of the United States and of the higher law of GOD, and those Senators and
Representatives who voted for it, and also those who were absent and consequently did not vote
against it, as traitors, Benedict Arnolds, and Judas Iscariots. The council also released the
"citizens, officers, and police of the city" from all obligation to assist or participate in the execu-
tion of the law, and declared that "it ought not to be respected by any intelligent community.^
On the next night, a mass meeting of the citizens was held for the purpose of approving and
sanctioning the action of the common council, and organizing violent and successful resistance
to the execution of the law. A committee reported to this meeting a series of resolutions more
revolutionary in their character, and going to a greater extent in resisting the authority of the
Federal Government, than even those of the common council. Numerous speeches, in support
of the resolutions, were received with boisterous and furious applause, pledging their authors to
resist even unto the dungeon and the grave. At length Mr. Douglas, being the only member
of the Illinois delegation then in the city, appeared upon the stand, and stated, that in consequence
of the action of the common council and the phrenzied excitement which seemed to rage all
around him, he desired to be heard before the assembled people of the city in vindication of all
the measures of adjustment, and especially of the Fugitive Slave law. He said he would not
make a speech that night, because the call for the meeting was not sufficiently broad to autho-
rize a speech in defence of those measures; but he would avail himself of that opportunity to give
notice that on the next night he would address the people of Chicago upon these subjects. He
invited men of all parties and shades of opinion to attend and participate in the proceedings, and
assured them that he would answer every objection made, and every question which should be
propounded, touching the measures of adjustment, and especially the Fugitive bill. After fur-
ther discussion, and much confusion^and opposition, the meeting was induced to adjourn, and
hear Mr. Douglas's defence before they would condemn him. In the mean time, the excitement
continued to increase, and the next night (Oct. 23d) a tremendous concourse of people assembled
— by far the largest meeting ever held in the city — and Mr. Douglas delivered a speech, of which
the following is a fair and tolerably good report, so far as to embrace the argument, omitting
necessarily numerous incidents which could not be preserved by the reporter. The meeting
then resolved unanimously to faithfully carry into effect the provisions of the Fugitive Slave law,
and to perform every other duty and obligation under the Constitution of the United States.
The meeting also adopted, with only eight or ten dissenting voices, a resolution repudiating the
^action of the common council, and then adjourned with nine cheers — three for Douglas, three for
the Constitution, and three for our glorious Union. On the next night, .the common council of
*he city of Chicago again assembled, and repealed their nullifying resolutions by a vote of 12 to 1.

SPEECH.

MR. DOUGLAS, said:

The agitation on the subject of Slavery now raging through the breadth of
the land presents a most extraordinary spectacle. Congress, after a protracted
session of nearly ten months, succeeded in passing a system of measures,
which are believed to be just to all parts of the Republic, and ought to be
satisfactory to the people. The South has not triumphed over the North, nor
has the North achieved a victory over the South. Neither party has made
any humiliating concessions to the other. Each has preserved its honor,
while neither has surrendered an impoitant right, or sacrificed any substantial
interest. The measures composing the scheme of adjustment are believed to
be in harmony with the principles of justice and the Constitution.

, And yet we find that the agitation is re-opened in the two extremes of the
Union with renewed vigor and increased violence. In some of the Southern
States, special sessions of the Legislatures are being called for the purpose of
organizing systematic and efficient measures of resistance to the execution of
the laws of the land, and for the adoption of Disunion as the remedy. In the
Northern States, municipal corporations, and other organized bodies of men,
are nullifying the acts of Congress, and raising the standard of rebellion
against the authority of the Federal Government.

At the South, the measures of adjustment are denounced as a disgraceful
s irrender of Southern rights to Northern abolitionism.

At the North, the same 'measures are denounced with equal violence as a
total abandonment of the rights of freemen to conciliate the slave power.

The Southern disunionists repudiate the authority of the highest judicial
tribunal on earth, upon the ground that it is a pliant and corrupt instrument in
the hands of Northern fanaticism.

The Northern nullifiers refuse to submit the points at issue to the same
exalted tribunal, upon the ground that the Supreme Court of the United States
is a corrupt and supple instrument in the hands of the Southern slave-ocracy.

For these contradictory reasons the people in both sections of the Union are
called upon to resist the laws of the land, and the authority of the Federal
Government, by violence, even unto death and disunion.

Strange and contradictory positions!

Both cannot be true, and I trust in God neither may prove to be. We have
fallen on evil times, when passion, and prejudice, and ambition, can so blind
the judgments and deaden the consciences of men, that the truth cannot be

seen and felt. The people of the North, or the South, or both, are acting
under a fatal delusion. Should we not pause, and reflect, and consider, whe-
ther we, as well as they, have not been egregiously deceived upon this subject.*
It is my purpose this evening to give a candid and impartial exposition of these
measures, to the end that the truth may be known. It does not become a free
people to rush madly and blindly into violence, and bloodshed, and death, and
disunion, without first satisfying our consciences upon whose souls the guilty
consequences must rest.

The measures, known as the Adjustment or Compromise scheme, are six in
number :

1. The admission of California, with her free constitution.

2. The creation of a Territorial government for Utah, leaving the people to-
regulate their own domestic institutions.

3. The creation of a Territorial government for New Mexico, with like pro-
visions.

4. The adjustment of the disputed boundary with Texas.

5. The abolition of the slave trade in the District of Columbia.

6. The Fugitive Slave bill.

The first three of these measures — California, Utah, and New Mexico— 1%
prepared with my own hands, and reported from the Committee on Territories,,
as its chairman, in the precise shape in which they now stand on the statute
book, with one or two unimportant amendments, for which 1 also voted. I,
therefore, hold myself responsible to you, as my constituents, for those mea-
sures as they passed. If there is anything wrong in them, hold me account-
able; if there is anything of merit, give the credit to those who passed the
bills. [These measures are predicated on the great fundamental principle that
every people ought to possess the right of forming and regulating their own.
internal concerns and domestic institutions in their own waj\ It was supposed
that those of our fellow citizens who emigrated to the shores of the Pacific and
to our other territories, were as capable of self-government as their neighbors
and kindred whom they left behind them; and there was no reason for believ-
ing that they have lost any of their intelligence or patriotism by the wayside,
while crossing the Isthmus or the Plains, fit was also believed, that after their
arrival in the country, when they had become familiar with its topography,
climate, productions, and resources, and had connected their destiny with it,
they were fully as competent to judge for themselves what kind of laws and
institutions were best adapted to their condition and interests, as we were who
never saw the country, and knew very little about ftA To question their compe-
tency to do this, was to deny their capacity for self-government. If they have
the requisite intelligence and honesty to be intrusted with the enactment of
laws for the government of white men, I know of no reason why they should
not be deemed competent to legislate for the negro. If they are sufficiently

enlightened to make laws for the protection of life, liberty, and property — oi
morals and education — to determine the relation of husband and wife, of
parent and child — I am not aware that it requires any higher degree of civili-
zation to regulate the affairs of master and servant. These things are all con-
fided by the Constitution to each State to decide for itself, and I know of no
reason why the same principle should not be extended to the Territories. My
votes and acts have been in accordance with these views in all cases, except
the instances in which I voted under your instructions. Those were your
votes, and not mine. I entered my protest against them at the time — before
and after they were recorded — and shall never hold myself responsible for
them. I believed then, and believe now, that it was better for the cause of
freedom, of humanity, and of republicanism^ to leave the people interested to
settle all these questions for themselves, v£hey have intellect and consciences
as well as we, and have more interest in doing that which is best for them-
selves and their posterity, than we have as their self-constituted and officious
guardians. I deem it fortunate for the peace and harmony of the country
that Congress, taking the same view of the subject, rejected the Proviso, and
passed the bills in the shape in which I originally reported them. So far as
slavery is concerned, I am sure that any man who will take the pains to
examine the history of the question, will come to the conclusion that this is
the true policy, as well as the sound republican doctrine) Mr. DOUGLAS
here went into a historical view of the subject, to show that Slavery had
never been excluded in fact from one inch of the American Continent by act
of Congress. When the Federal Constitution was formed in '87, twelve of
the thirteen States, then composing the Confederation, h'eld slaves, and sus-
tained the institution of slavery by their laws. Since that period slavery had
been abolished in six of these twelve original slave States. How was this
effected? (Not by an act of Congress. Not by the interposition of the Federal
povernment. Congress had no power over the subject, and never attempted
to interfere with it. Slavery was abolished in those States by the people of
each, acting for themselves, and upon their own motion and responsibility.
The people became convinced that it was for their own interests, and the
interests of their posterity, pecuniarily and morally, and they did it of their
own free will, and rigidly enforced their own lawQ

So it was in the territory northwest of the Ohio river. \JBy the act of Congress,
known as the Ordinance of '87, slavery was prohibited by LAW, but not exclud-
ed in fact. Slavery existed in the Territories of Illinois and Indiana, in spite
of the ordinance, under the authority of the territorial laws. Illinois was a
slaveholding Territory in defiance of the act of Congress, but became a free
State by the action of our own people, when they framed our State constitution,
preparatory to their admission into the Union. So it was with Indiana. 0]-e-
gon prohibited slavery by the action of her people under their provisional govern-

8

ment, several years before Congress established a territorial government, (jn
short, wherever slavery has been excluded, a^dfree institutions established, it
has been done by the voluntary action of the jpeople interested. Wherever
Congress attempted to interfere in opposition to tfre wishes of the people of the
territory, its enactments remained a dead letter upoYi the statute book, and the
people took such legislative action as comported with Iheir inclinations and sup-
posed interftsts.N

Mr. DouGLAjKhen referred to the country acquired from Mexico, and called
tha attention of the audience to the fact that the abolitionists had all predicted
that slavery would certainly be introduced into those territories, unless Congress
interfered and prohibited it by law, and condemned him because he was oppos-
ed to such interferenc^) The problem is now solved. What was then a matter
of opinion and disputation, has become an historical fact. Time has settled the
Controversy, and shown who was right and who was wrong. (The Wilmot Proviso
'was fcj* adopted. Congress did not prohibit slavery in those territories, and yet
slavery dot? not exist in them. In California, it was prohibited by the people
in the constituuon with which that State was admitted into the Union. It is
well known that the people of New Mexico, when they formed a constitution
with the view of asking admission, also prohibited slavery. These facts show
conclusively ihat al7 the predictions of the abolitionists upon, this subject have
been falsified by h xstory, and that my own have been literally fulfilled^ I refer to
these facts, not in ti^e spirit of self-gratulation, but to show that these men, who
have alarmed the fr ;ends of freedom, and for a time partially controlled the
popular sentiment we *e themselves mistaken, and misled their followers; at the
sarne time that their d 'trine was at war with the whole spirit of our republi-
can institutions.

Rnf 1^ easures immediately under discussion. It must be

t let us return to the to /-^ , i, r , . . , ,

conceded th t th ^e admission °* California was not free from dif

firnuv ^ct of slavery. There were many irregularities

fccuity, independent of the subit / v f A

in the proc d' v steP m ner aPPucation for admission was

lngs in fact> ever,,.-' ,lce to a literal compliance with the most

approved rde? 7^ ^ ^^ ' '^ of »™ States' On the °ther hand'
usages in the admi./' suited from the necessity of the case.
Ji ^nouiu be borne in m' <•? *v,
Cono-ress h d f 'l *> Ffc ad estaDl>shed no territorial govern-

ment, and made „ '^ "' ^~^^ " '™ into the Union- She was left

w;thm provision for her admissi, ^d to provide one for herself. She

u.thou, government, and was therefore compdlt established, nor comply with

whichCil'^L^;:11 had not been ' irreguiariiies had °ccurred'

9

irregularities, as they are called, had intervened and been waived in the course
of our legislative history. Besides, the territory of California was too exten-
sive for one State, (if we are to adopt the old States as a guide in carving out
new ones,) being about three times the size of New York; and her boundaries
were unnatural and unreasonable, disregarding the topography of the country,
•and embracing the whole mining region and her coast in the limits. Thus it
will be seen that the slavery question was not the only real difficulty that the
admission of California presented to the minds of calm and reflecting men;
although it cannot be denied that it was the exciting cause, which stimulated
a large portion of the people in one section to demand her instant admission,
and in the other, to insist upon her unconditional rejection. Even in this point
of view, I humbly conceive that the ultras in each extreme of the Republic
acted under a misconception of their true interests and real policy. The whole
of California — from the very nature of the country, her rocks and sands, elevation
above the sea, climate, soil, and productions — was bound to be free territory
by the decision of her own people, no matter when admitted or how divided.
Hence, if considered with reference to the preponderance of political power
between the free and slaveholding States, it was manifestly the true policy of
the South to include the whole country in one State; while the same reasons
should have induced the North to subdivide it into as many States as the extent
of the territory would justify. But, in my opinion, it was not proper for Con-
gress to act upon any such principle. We should know no North, no South,
in our legislation; but lock to the interests of the whole country. By our action
in this case, the rights and privileges of California and the Pacific coast were
principally to be affected. By erecting the country into one State instead of
three, the people are to be represented in the Senate by two in the place of six
Senators. If their interests suffer in consequence, they can blame no one but
themselves; for Congress only confirmed what they had previously done. The
problem in relation to slavery should have been much more easily solved. It
was a question which concerned the people of California alone. .The other
States of the Union had no interest in it, and no right to interfere with it. South
Carolina settled that question within her own limits to suit herself; Illinois has
decided it in a manner satisfactory to her own people; and upon what principle
are we to deprive the people of the State of California of a right which is com-
mon, to every State in the Union ?

fThe bills establishing territorial governments for Utah and New Mexico are
silent upon the subject of slavery; except the provision that, when they should
be admitted into the Union as States, each should decide the question of slavery
for itself. This latter provision was not incorporated in my original bills, for
the reason that I conceived it. to involve a principle so clearly deducible from
the Constitution that it was unnecessary to embody it in the form of legal
enactment. But when it was offered as an amendment to the bills, I cheer-

10

fully voted for it, lest its rejection should be deemed a denial of the principle
asserted in it. The abolitionists of the North profess to regard these bills as
a total abandonment of the principles of freedom, because they do not contain
an express prohibition of slavery; while the ultras of the South denounce the
same measures as equivalent to the Wilmot Proviso/)

Of the Texas boundary I have but little to say, for the reason that I have
scarcely heard it alluded to since my return home, although many complaints
are made against it in other portions of the free States. It was an unfortunate
dispute, which could result in no practical benefit to either party, no matter
how decided. The territory in controversy was of no considerable value. If
there was a spot upon the face of the American continent more worthless
than any other; if there was a barren waste more desolate — sands more arid,
and rocks more naked than all others — it was the country in dispute between
Texas and the United States. Distant from navigation, and almost inaccessible
for want of means of communication; void of timber, fuel, water or soil, with
the exception of here and there a nook in the gorges of the mountains; it was
entirely useless, save as it afforded hiding places for the wild and roaming savages.
And yet the controversy was none the less serious and fierce in consequence
of the barrenness of the country. Texas believed it to be hers, and deemed
it a point of honor to maintain her title at all hazards and against all odds.
Many of the States entertained doubts of the validity of the Texan claim, while
others considered it entirely without foundation. In this state of the case,
each party having partial possession, was mustering troops to render its pos-
session complete to the exclusion of the other. Many of the slaveholding
States, from sympathy with the peculiar institutions of Texas, were preparing
to array themselves on the one side; while most of the free States, from aver-
sion to those institutions, were expected to array themselves on the other.
Thus were we plunging headlong and madly into a civil war, involving results
which no human wisdom could foresee, and consequences which could be con-
templated only with horror.

Fortunately this unnatural struggle was averted by the timely and judicious
interposition of Congress. The Committee on Territories, to whom the subject
had been referred, found it impossible to ascertain and agree upon the true
boundary line of Texas, and accordingly authorized me, as their chairman, to
report a bill for adjusting the boundary upon an arbitrary but convenient line,

drawn through the centre of the Desert, and to pay Texas dollars

for relinquishing her claim to the waste lands outside of that line. I, there-
fore, reported this provision, at the same time that I brought in the bills for
California, Utah, and New Mexico, with the intention of moving to fill the
blank with ten millions of dollars. When the Committee of Thirteen, which
was subsequently appointed, united into one the several bills which had been re-
ported by the Committee on Territories, and thus formed what has been known

11

as the " Omnibus Bill,'' they made a slight change in the line which had been
agreed upon by the Territorial committee. Upon the defeat of the Omnibus,
Mr. PIERCE, of Maryland, brought in a separate bill for adjusting this boundary,
predicated upon the principle, also, of an arbitrary but convenient line through
the Desert, changing the courses, however, so as to obviate some objections
which have been urged to the others, and paying Texas ten millions of dol-
lars for relinquishing her claim. This bill, after having 'been joined in the
House of Representatives to the bill establishing a Territorial government for
New Mexico, passed both Houses, and became the law of the land. The peo-
ple of Texas have since ratified it at the polls by an overwhelming majority;
and thus this dangerous element of agitation has been withdrawn from the con-
troversy by the mutual assent of the parties. And yet there are organized
parties, in both extremes of the Union, who are striving to re-open the contro-
versy by persuading the people that the rights and interests of their own par-
ticular section have been basely betrayed in the settlement of this question.
At the South, it is boldly proclaimed, and every where repeated, that sixty thou-
sand square miles of slave-territory have been sold and converted into free-soil.
On the other hand, the Northern nullifiers and Abolitionists are industriously
impressing it upon the people that more than fifty thousand square miles of free-
soil have been transferred to Texas, and converted into slave-territory by the
act of Congress adjusting the Texas boundary. Such are the extremities to
which prejudice and ambition can lead desperate men ! Neither party has
gained or lost any thing, so far as the question of slavery is concerned. Texas
has gained ten millions of dollars, and the United States have saved, in blood
and treasure, the expenses of a civil war.

rThe next in the series of measures was the bill for the abolition of the slave
tracle in the district of Columbia. This bill was prepared and reported by the
Committee of Thirteen, and I gave it my cordial support. It has been repre-
sented at the South as a concession to the North, to induce us to perform our
duties under the Constitution in the surrender of fugitives from labor, and
much opposition has been raised against the whole scheme of adjustment on
that account. I did not regard it in that light. My vote was given upon no
such considerations. I believed each of the measures substantially right in
itself, and, under the extraordinary circmnstances by which we were sur-
rounded, eminently wise and expedienyTThe bill does not abolish slavery in
the district — does not emancipate the few slaves that are there, and interferes
with no man's right of property. It simply provides that slaves shall not be
brought from the surrounding States, or elsewhere, into the district for sale. In
this respect, Congress only followed the example of the legislatures of Mary-
land, North Carolina, Kentucky, and, in fact, most of the slaveholding States.
The country e*mbraced within the limits of the District of Columbia, therefore,
stands in precisely the same relation to the slave trade under this law, that it

12

would have stood un<ter the laws of Maryland, if it had never been sep-
arated from that State^W hat justification can there be, then, for the assertion
that this was a concession to the North? It does nothing more nor less than to
apply the general principles of the legislation of a majority of the Southern
States to the District of Columbia. But, while it was no concession from one
section to the other, I had a right to expect that those modern philanthropists
who have declaimed so eloquently and violently against the disgrace of the Na-
tional Capitol, by the slave trade within its precincts, would have rejoiced with
exceeding joy at the passage of this act^ I have listened in vain for one word
of approval or commendation from the advocates of abolition and nullification.
While the whole series of Compromise measures are denounced in coarse and
unmeasured terms, not one word of congratulation to the friends of freedom —
not a word of approval of the act or of the conduct of those who voted for it — is
allowed to escape their lips. (All the other measures of the scheme of adjust-
ment are attempted to be keptln the background, and concealed from the pub-
^ic view, in order that more prominence and importance may tue given to what
they are pleased to call "THE INFAMOUS FUGITIVE SLAVE BILLJ^

Before I proceed to the exposition of that bill, I will read the preamble and
resolutions passed by the common council of this city, night before last.

Mr. Douglass then read as follows:

Whereas, The Constitution of the United atives in Congress from the Free States, who

States provides that the privilege of the writ of aided and assisted in the passage of this infa-

Habeas Corpus shall ,not be suspended, unless mous law, and those who basely sneaked away

when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the from their seats, and thereby evaded the ques-

public safety may require it; and, tion, richly merit the reproach of all lovers of

Whereas, The late act of Congress, purport- freedom, and are fit only to be ranked with the

ing to be for the recovery of fugitive slaves, traitors, Benedict Arnold and Judas Iscariot,

virtually suspends the Habeas Corpus and who betrayed his Lord and Master for thirty

abolishes the right of trial by jury, and by its pieces of silver.

provisions, not only fugitive slaves, but white Jlnd Resolved, That the citizens, officers, and
men, "owing service" to another in another police of the city be, and they are hereby, re-
State, viz., the apprentice, the mechanic, the quested to abstain from any and all interference
farmer, the laborer engaged on contract or oth- in the capture and delivering up of the fugitive
crwise, whose terms of service are unexpired, from unrighteous oppression, of whatever na-
may be captured and carried off summarily, tion, name, or color,
and without legal resource of any kind; and, Resolved, That the fugitive slave law lately

Whereas, No law can be legally or morally passed by Congress is a cruel and unjust law,

binding on us which violates the provisions of and ought not to be respected by any intelli-

the Constitution; and, gent community, and that this Council will not

Whereas, Above all, in the responsibilities require the city police to render any assistance

of human life, and the practice and propagation for the arrest of fugitive slaves,

of Christianity, the laws of God should be held AYES — Aid. Milliken, Loyd, Sherwood,

paramount to all human compacts and statutes: Foss, Throop, Sherman, Richards, Brady, and

Therefore, Dodge.

Resolved, That the Senators and Represent- NATS — Aid. Page and Williams.

But for the passage of these resolutions, said Mr. D., I should not have ad-
dressed you this evening, nor, indeed, at any time before my return to the
Capitol. I have no desire to conceal or withhold my opinions, no wish to avoid
the responsibility of a full and frank expression of them, upon this and all other
subjects which were embraced in the action of the last session of Congress.

13

My reasons for wishing to avoid public discussion at this time, were to be found
in the state of my health and the short time allowed me to remain among you.
Now to the resolutions. I make no criticism upon the language in which
they are expressed; that is a matter of taste, and in every thing of that kind I
defer to the superior refinement of our city fathers. But it cannot be disguised
that the polite epithets of "traitors, Benedict Arnold and Judas Iscariot, who
betrayed his lord and master for thirty pieces of silver," will be understood
abroad as having a direct personal application to my esteemed colleague, Gen.
SHIELDS, and myself. Whatever may have been the intention of those who voted;
for the resolutions, I will do the members of the council the justice to say,
that I do not believe they intended to make any such application. But
their secret intentions are of little consequence, when they give their official
sanction to a charge of infamy, clothed in such language that every man who
reads it must give it a personal application. The whole affair, however, looks
strange, and even ludicrous, when contrasted with the cordial reception and
public demonstrations of kindness and confidence, and even gratitude for sup-
posed services, extended to my colleague and myself upon our arrival in this
city one week ago. Then we were welcomed home as public benefactors, and
invited to partake of a public dinner, by an invitation numerously signed by
men of all parties and shades of opinion. The invitation had no sooner been
declined, for reasons which were supposed to be entirely satisfactory, and my
colleague started for his home, than the common council, who are presumed to
speak officially for the whole population of the city, attempted to brand their
honored guests with infamy, and denounce them as Benedict Arnolds and Ju-
das Iscariots! I have read somewhere that it was a polite custom, in other
countries and a different age, to invite those whom they secretly wishe^ to
destroy to a feast, in order to secure a more convenient opportunity of admin-
istering the hemlock! I acquit the common council of any design of intro-
ducing that custom into our hospitable city. But I have done with this sub-
ject, so far as it has a personal bearing.

^It is a far more important and serious matter, when viewed with reference
to the principles involved, and the consequences which may result. The com-
mon council of the city of Chicago have assumed to themselves the right,
and actually exercised the power, of determining the validity of an act of Con-
gress, and have declared it void upon the ground that it violates the Constitu-
tion of the United States and the law of God! They have gone further; they
declared, by a solemn official act, that a law passed by Congress "ought not
to be respected by any intelligent community," and have called upon "the
citizens, officers, and police of the city" to abstain from rendering any aid or
assistance in its execution! What is this but naked, unmitigated nullification?
An act of the American Congress nullified by the common council of the city
of Chicago! Whence did the council derive their authority ? I have been able

14

to find no such provision in the city charter, nor am I aware that the legisla-
ture of Illinois is vested with any rightful power to confer such authority}
I have yet to learn that a subordinate municipal corporation is licensed to raise
the standard of rebellion, and throw off the authority of the Federal Government,
at pleasure! This is a great improvement upon South Carolinian nullification.
It dispenses with the trouble, delay, and expense of convening legislatures and
assembling conventions of the people, for the purpose of resolving themselves
back into their original elements, preparatory to the contemplated revolution.
It has the high merit of marching directly to its object, and by a simple resolu-
tion, written and adopted on the same night, relieving the people from their
oaths and allegiance, and of putting ths nation and its laws at defiance! It has
heretofore been supposed, by men of antiquated notions, who have not kept up
with the progress of the age, that the Supreme Court of the United States was in-
vested with the power of determining the validity of an act of Congress pass-
ed in pursuance of the forms of the Constitution. This was the doctrine of the
entire North, and of the nation, when it became necessary to exert the whole
power of the Government to put down nullification in another portion ot the
Union. But the spirit of the age is progressive, and is by no means confined
to advancement in the arts and physical sciences. The science of politics and
of government is also rapidly advancing to maturity and perfection. It is not
long since that I heard an eminent lawyer propose an important reform in the
admirable judicial system of our State, which, he thought, would render it
perfect. It was so simple and eminently practicable, that it could not fail to
excite the admiration of even the casual inquirer. His proposition was, that
our judicial system should be so improved as to allow an appeal, on all consti-
tutional questions, from the supreme court of this State to two justices of the
peace! When that shall have been effected, but one other reform will be neces-
sary to render our national system perfect, and that is, to change the federal
Constitution, so as to authorize an appeal, upon all questions touching the va-
lidity of acts of Congress, from the Supreme Court of the United States to the
common council of the city of Chicago!.

So much for the general principles involved in the acts of the council. I
will now examine briefly the specific grounds of objection urged by the council
against the Fugitive Slave bill, as reasons why it should not be obeyed.

The objections are two in number : first, that it suspends the writ of habeas
corpus in time of peace, in violation of the Constitution ; secondly, that it
abolishes the right of trial by jury.

How the council obtained the information that these two odious provisions
were contained in the law, I am unable to divine. One thing is certain, that
the members of the council, who voted for these resolutions, had never read the
law, or they would have discovered their mistake. There is not one word in
it in respect to the writ of habeas corpus or the right of trial by jury. Neither

15

of these subjects is mentioned or referred to. The law is entirely silent on
those points. Is it to be said that an act of Congress, which is silent on the
subject, ought to be construed to repeal a great constitutional right by implica-
tion ? Besides, this act is only an amendment — amendatory of the old law —
the act of 1793 — but does not repeal it. There is no difference between the
original act and the amendment, in this respect. Both are silent in regard to
the writ of habeas corpus and the right of trial by jury. If to be silent is to
suspend the one and abolish the other, then the mischief was done by the old
law fifty-seven years ago. If this construction be correct, the writ of habeas
corpus has been suspended, and trial by jury abolished, more than half a century,
without anybody ever discovering the fact, or, if knowing it, without uttering
a murmur of complaint.

Mr. DOUGLAS then read the whole of the act of 1793, and compared its pro-
visions with the amendment ofjast session, for the purpose of showing that
the writ of habeas corpus and the right of trial by jury were not alluded to or
interfered with by either. But I maintain, said Mr. D., that the writ of
habeas corpus is applicable to the case of the arrest of a fugitive under this
law, in the same sense in which the Constitution intended to confer it, and to
the fullest extent for which that writ is ever rightfully issued in any case. In
this I am fully sustained by the opinion of Mr. Crittenden, the Attorney
General of the United States. As soon as the bill passed the two Houses of
Congress, an abolition paper raised the alarm that the habeas corpus had been
suspended, The cry was eagerly caught up, and transmitted, by lightning,
upon the wires, to every part of the Union, by those whose avocation is agita-
tion. The President of the United States, previous to signing the bill, referred
it to the Attorney General, for his opinion upon the point whether any portion
of it violated any provision of the Constitution of the United States, and
especially whether it could possibly be construed to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus. I have the answer of the Attorney General before me, in which he
gives it as his decided opinion that every part of the law is entirely consistent
with the Constitution, and that it does not suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
I would commend the argument of the Attorney General to the careful perusal
of those who have doubts upon the subject. Upon the presentation of this
opinion, and with entire confidence in its correctness, President Filmore signed
the bill.

[Here Mr. DOUGLAS was interrupted by a person present, who called his
attention to the last clause of the 6th section of the bill, which he read, and
asked him what construction he put upon it, if it did not suspend the writ of
habeas corpus.]

Mr. Douglas, in reply, expressed his thanks to the gentleman who pro-
pounded the inquiry. His object was to meet every point, and remove every
doubt that could possibly be raised ; and he expressed the hope that every

16

gentleman present would exercise the privilege of asking him questions upon
all points upon which he was not fully satisfied. He then proceeded to answer
the question which had been propounded. That section of the bill provides
for the arrest of the fugitive and the trial before the commissioner ; and, if
the facts of servitude, ownership, and escape be established by competent
evidence, the commissioner shall grant a certificate to that effect, which certi-
ficate shall be conclusive of the right of the person in whose favor it is issued
to remove the fugitive to the State from which he fled. Then comes the
clause which is supposed to suspend the habeas corpus: "Jlnd shall prevent all
molestation of said person or persons by any process issued by any court, judge,,
magistrate j or other person whomsoever."

The question is asked, whether the writ of habeas corpus is not a " PROCESS "
within the meaning of this act? I answer, that it undoubtedly is such a " pro-
cess," and that it may be issued by any court or judge having competent
authority — not for the purpose of " molesting" a claimant, having a servant
in his possession, with such a certificate from the commissioner or judge, but
for the purpose of ascertaining the fact whether he has such a certificate or
not; and if so, whether it be in due form of law; and if not, by what authority
he holds the servant in custody. Upon the return of the writ of habeas corpus,
the claimant will be required to exhibit to the court his authority for conveying
that servant back; and if he produces a "certificate" from the commissioner
or judge, in due form of law, the court will decide that it has no power to " molest
the claimant" in the exercise of his rights under the law and the Constitution.
But if the claimant is not able to produce such certificate, or other lawful
authority, or produces one which is not in conformity with law, the court will
set the alleged servant at liberty, for the very reason that the law has not been
complied with. The sole object of the writ of habeas corpus is to ascertain
by what authority a person is held in custody; to release him, if no such au-
thority be shown; and to refrain from any molestation of the claimant, if legal
authority be produced. The habeas corpus is necessary, therefore, to carry
the Fugitive law into effect, and, at the same time, to prevent a violation
of the rights of freemen under it. It is essential to the security of the claim-
ant, as well as the protection of the rights of those liable to be arrested under
it. The reason that the writ of habeas corpus was not mentioned in the bill
must be obvious. The object of the new law seems to have been, to amend
the old one in those particulars wherein experience had proven amendments to
be necessary, and in all other respects to leave it as it had stood from the
days of Washington. The provisions of the old law have been subjected to the
test of long experience — to the scrutiny of the bar and the judgment of the
courts. The writ of habeas corpus had been adjudged to exist in all cases
under it, and had always been resorted to when a proper case arose. In

17

amending the law there was no necessity for any new provision upon this sub-
ject, because nobody desired to change it in this respect.

But why this extraordinary effort, on the part of the professed friends of the
fugitive, to force such a construction upon the law, in the absence of any such
obnoxious provision, as to deprive him of the benefit of the writ of habeas cor-
pus? The law does not do so in terms; and if it is ever accomplished, it must
be done by implication, contrary to the understanding of those who enacted it,
and in opposition to the practice of the courts, acquiesced in by the people, from
the foundation of {he government. One would naturally suppose, that if there
was room for doubt as to what is the true construction, those who claim to be
the especial and exclusive friends of the negro would contend for that construc-
tion which is most favorable to liberty, justice, and humanity. But not so.
Directly the reverse is the fact. They exhaust their learning, and exert all their
ingenuity and skill, to deprive the negro of all rights under the law. What can
be the motive? Certainly not to protect the rights of the free, or to extend
liberty to the oppressed; for they strive to fasten upon the law such a construc-
tion as would defeat both of these ends. Can it be a political scheme, to ren-
der the law odious, and to excite prejudice against all who voted for it, or were
unavoidably absent when it passed ? No matter what the motive, the effect
would be disastrous to those whose rights they profess to cherish, if their efforts
should be successful.

Now, a word or two in regard to the right of trial by jury. The city council,
in their resolutions, say that this law abolishes that right. I have already shown
you that the council are mistaken — that the law is silent upon the subject, and
stands now precisely as it has stood for half a century. If the law is defective
on that point, the error was committed by our fathers in 1793, and the people
have acquiesced in it ever since, without knowing of its existence or caring to
remedy it. The new act neither takes away nor confers the right of trial by
jury. It leaves it just where our fathers and the Constitution left it under the
old law. That the right of trial by jury exists in this country for all men, black
or white, bond or free, guilty or innocent, no man will be disposed to question
who understands the subject. The right is of universal application, and exists
alike in all the States of the Union; it always has existed, and always will exist,
so long as the Constitution of the United States shall be respected and main-
tained, in spite of the efforts of the abolitionists to take it away by a perversion
of the Fugitive law. The only question is, whwe shall this jury trial take place?
Shall the jury trial be had in the State where the arrest is made, or the State
from which the fugitive escaped ? Upon this point the act of last session says
nothing, and, of course, leaves the matter as it stood under the law of '93.
The old law was silent on this point, and therefore left the courts to decide it
in accordance with the Constitution. The highest judicial tribunals in the land
have always held that the jury trial must take place in the State under whose

18

jurisdiction the question arose, and whose laws were alleged to have been vio-
lated. The same construction has always been given to the law for surrender-
ing fugitives from justice. It provides also for sending back the fugitive, but
says nothing about the jury trial, or where it shall take place. Who ever sup-
posed that that act abolished the right of trial by jury? Every day's practice
and observation teach us otherwise. The jury trial is always had in the State
from which the fugitive fled. So it is with a fugitive from labor. When he
returns, or is surrendered under the law, he is entitled to a trial by jury of his
right of freedom, and always has it when he demands it. There is great uni-
formity in the mode of proceeding in the courts of the southern States in this
respect. When the supposed slave sets up his claim, to the judge or other offi-
cer, that he is free, and claims his freedom, it becomes the duty of the court to
issue its summons to the master to appear in court with the alleged slave, and
there to direct an issue of freedom or servitude to be made and tried by a jury.
The master is also required to enter into bonds for his own appearance and that
of the alleged slave at the trial of the cause, and that he will not remove the
slave from the county or jurisdiction of the court in the mean time. The court
is also required to appoint counsel to conduct the cause for the slave, while the
master employs his own counsel. All the officers of the court are required by
law to render all facilities to the slave for the prosecution of his suit free of
charge, such as issuing and serving subpoenas for witnesses, &c. If upon the
trial the alleged slave is held to be a free man, the master is required to pay the
costs on both sides. If, on the other hand, he is held to be a slave, the State
pays the costs. This is the way in which the trial by jury stood under the old
law; and the new one makes no change in this respect. If the act of last ses-
sion be repealed, that will neither benefit nor injure the fugitive, HO far as the
right of trial by jury is concerned.

For these two reasons — the habeas corpus and the trial by jury — the common
council have pronounced the law unconstitutional, and declared that it ought
not to be respected by an enlightened community. I have shown that neither
of the objections are well founded, and that if they had taken the trouble to
read the law before they nullified it, they would have avoided the mistake into
which they have fallen. I have spoken of the acts of the city council in gene-
ral terms, and it ma}7 be inferred that the vote was unanimous. I take pleasure
in stating that I learn from the published proceedings that there was bsrely a
quorum present, and that Aldermen Page and Williams voted in the negative.

Having disposed of the two reasons assigned by the common council for the
nullification of the law, I shall be greatly indebted to any gentleman who will
point out any other objection to the new law, which does not apply with equal
force to the old one. My object in drawing the parallel between the new and
old law is this : The law of '93 was passed by the patriots and sages who
framed our glorious Constitution, and approved by the father of his country.

19

I have always been taught to believe that they were men well versed in the
science of government, devotedly attached to the cause of freedom, and capa-
ble of construing the Constitution in the spirit in which they made it. That
act has been enforced and acquiesced in for more than half a century, without
a murmur or word of complaint from any quarter.

I repeat — will any gentleman be kind enough to point out a single objection
to the new law, which might not be urged with equal propriety to the act
of '93 ?

[Here a gentleman present rose, and called the attention of Mr. DOUGLAS to
the penalties in the seventh section of the new law, and desired to know if
there were any such obnoxious provisions in the old one.]

Mr. DOUGLAS then read the section referred to, and also the fourth section
of the act of '93, and proceeded to draw the parallel between them. Each
makes it a criminal offence to resist the due execution of the law; to knowingly
and wilfully obstruct or hinder the claimant in the arrest of the fugitive; to
rescue such fugitive from the claimant when arrested; to harbor or conceal
such person after notice that he or she was a fugitive from labor. In this
respect the two laws were substantially the same in every important particular.
Indeed the one was almost a literal copy of the other. I can conceive of no
act which would be an offence under the one, that would not be punishable
under the other. In the speeches last night, great importance was given to
the clause which makes it an offence to harbor or conceal a fugitive. You
were told that you could not clothe the naked, nor feed the hungry, nor exer-
cise the ordinary charities towards suffering humanity, without incurring the
penalty of the law. Is this a true construction of that provision ? The act
does not so read. The law says that you shall not " harbor or conceal such
fugitive, so as to prevent the discovery and arrest of such person after notice or-
knowledge of the fact that such person was a fugitive from service or labor as
aforesaid." This does not deprive you of the privilege of extending charities
to the fugitive. You may feed him, clothe him, may lodge him, provided you
do not harbor or conceal him, so as to prevent discovery and arrest, after notice
or knowledge that he is a fugitive. The offence consists in preventing the dis-
covery and arrest of the fugitive after knowledge of the fact, and not in ex-
tending kindness and charities to him. This is the construction put upon a
similar provision in the old law by the highest judicial tribunals in the land.
The only difference between the old law and the new one, in respect to ob-
structing its execution, is to be found in the amount of the penalty, and not in
the principle involved.

But it is further objected that the new law provides, in addition to the penalty
for a civil suit for damages, to be recovered by an action of debt by any court
having jurisdiction of the cause. This is true; but it is also true that a similar

20

provision is to be found in the old law. The concluding clause in the last sec-
tion of the act of '93 is as follows :

" Which penalty may be recovered by and for the benefit of such claimant,
by action of debt, in any proper court to try the same; saving, moreover, to the
person claiming such labor or service, Ms right of action for or on account
the said injuries, or either of them."

Thus it will be seen, that upon this point there is no difference between the
new and the old law.

Is there any other provision of this law upon which explanation is desired ?

[A gentleman present referred to the 10th section, and desired an explana-
tion of the object and effect of the record from another State therein pro-
vided for.]

I am glad, said Mr. D., that my attention has been called to that provision;
for I heard a construction given to it, in the speeches last night, entirely dif-
ferent to the plain reading and object of that section. It is said, that this
provision authorizes the claimant to go before a court of record of the county
and State where he lives, and there establish by ex parte testimony, in the
absence of the fugitive, the facts of servitude, of ownership, and escape; and
when a record of these facts shall have been made, containing a minute
description of the slave, it shall be conclusive evidence against a person cor-
responding to that description, arrested in another State, and shall consign the
person so arrested to perpetual servitude. The law contemplates no such
thing, and authorizes no such result. I have the charity to believe that those
Avho have put this construction upon it have not carefully examined it. The
record from another State predicated upon " satisfactory proof to such court or
judge" before whom the testimony may be adduced, and the record made, is
to be conclusive of two facts only:

1st. That the person named in the record does owe service to the person in
whose behalf the record is made.

2d. That such person has escaped from service.

The language of the law is, that "the transcript of the record authenticated,"
&c., " shall be held and take," to be full and conclusive evidence of the fact of
escape, and that the service or labor of such person escaping is due to the
party in such record mentioned." The record is conclusive of these two
facts, so Tar as to authorize the fugitive to be sent l uck for trial under the laws
of the State whence he fled; but it is no evidence that the person arrested here
is the fugitive named in the record. The question of identity is to be proven
here to the satisfaction of the commissioner or judge, before whom the trial is
had, by " other and fur H if r evidence." This is the great point in the case.
The whole question turns upon it. The man arrested may correspond to the
description set forth in the record, and yet not be the same individual. We

2h

often meet persons resembling each other to such an extent that the one is
frequently mistaken for the other. The identity of the person becomes a mat-
ter of proof — a fact to be established by the testimony of competent and
disinterested witnesses, and to be decided by the tribunal before whom the
trial is had, conscientiously and impartially, according to the evidence in the
case. Tne description in the record, unsupported by other testimony, is not
evidence of the identity. It is not inserted for the especial benefit of the
claimant — much less to the prejudice of the alleged slave. It is required as a test
of truth, a safe-guard against fraud, which will often operate favorably to the
fugitive, but never to his injury. If the description be accurate and true, no
injustice can possibly result from it. But if it be erroneous or false, the
claimant is concluded by it; and the fugitive, availing himself of the error,
defeats the claim, in the same manner as a discrepancy between the allega-
tions and the proof, in any other case, results to the advantage of the defend-
ant. M repeat, that when an arrest is made under a record from another State,
the identity of the person must be established by competent testimony. The
trial, in this instance, would be precisely the same as in the case of a white
man arrested on the charge of being a fugitive from justice. The writ of the
governor, predicated upon an indictment, or even an affidavit, from another
State, containing the charge of crime, would be conclusive evidence of the
right to take the fugitive back; but the identity of the person in that case, as
well as a fugitive from labor, must be proven in the State where the arrest is
made, by competent witnesses, before the tribunal provided by law for that
purpose. In this respect, therefore, the negro is placed upon a perfect equality
with the white man who is so unfortunate as to be charged with an offence in
another State, whether the charge be true or false?^) In some respects, the law
guards the rights of the negro, charged with being a fugitive from labor, more
rigidly than it does those of a white man who is alleged to be a fugitive from
justice. The record from another State must be predicated upon " proof satis-
factory to the court or judge" before whom it is made, and must set forth the
"matter proved," before it can be evidence against a fugitive from labor, or for
any purpose; whereas, an innocent white man, who is so unfortunate as to be
falsely charged with a crime in another State, by the simple affidavit of an
unknown person, without indictment, or proof to the satisfaction of any court,
is liable to be transported to the most distant portions of this Union for trial.
Here we find the act of last session is a great improvement upon the law of
'93 in refeience to fugitives, white or black, whether they fled from justice or
labor. But it is objected that the testimony before the court making the record
isexparte, and therefore in violation of the principles of justice and the Consti-
tution, because it deprives the accused of the privilege of meeting the wit-
nesses face to face, and of cross examination. Gentlemen forget that all pro-
ceedings for the arrest of fugitives are necessarily ex parte, from the nature of

22

the case. They have fled beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and the object
of the proceeding is that they may be brought back, confront the witnesses,
and receive a fair trial according to the constitution and laws. If they would
stay at home in order to attend the trial and cross examine the witnesses, the
record would be unnecessary, and the Fugitive law in operative. It is no an-
swer to this proposition tp^gay that slavery is no crime, and therefore the par-
allel does not hold good. (I am not speaking of the guilt or innocence of sla-
very. I am discussing our obligations under the constitution of the United
States, ~^That sacred instrument says that a fugitive from labor " shall be de-
livered up on the claim of the owner. The same clause of the same instrument
provides that fugitives from justice shall be delivered up. We are bound by
our oaths to our God to see that claim as well as every other provision of the Con-
stitution carried into effect. The moral, religious, and constitutional obligations
resting upon us, here and hereafter, are the same in the one case as in the other.
As citizens, owing allegiance to the Government and duties to society, we
have no right to interpose our individual opinions and scruples as excuses for
violating the supreme law of the land as our fathers made it, and as we are
sworn to support it. The obligation is just as sacred, under the Constitution, to
surrender fugitives from labor as fugitives from justice. And the Congress of
the United States, according to the decision of the Supreme Court, are as im-
peratively commanded to provide the necessary legislation for the one as for
the other. The a-"t of 1793, to which I have had occasion to refer so fre-
quently, and which has been read to you, provided for these two cases in the
same bill. The first half of that act, relating to fugitives from justice, applies,
from the nature and necessity of the case, principally to white men; and the
other half, for the same reasons, applies exclusively to the negro race. I have
shown you, by reading and comparing the two laws in your presence, that
there is no constitutional guaranty — or common law right — or legal, or judicial
privilege — for the protection of the white man against oppression and injustice,
under the law, framed in 1793, and now in force, for the surrender of fugitives
from justice, that dees not apply in all its force in behalf of the negro, when
arrested as a fugitive from labor, under the act of the last session. What more
can the friends of the negro ask than, in all his civil and legal rights under the
Constitution, he shall be placed on an equal footing with the white man? But
it is said that the law is susceptible of being abused by perjury and false tes-
timony. To what human enactment does not the same objection lie? You, or
I, or any other man, who was never in California in his life, are liable, under
the constitution, to be sent there in chains for trial as a fugitive from justice by
means of perjury and fraud. But does this fact prove that the Constitution, and
the laws for carrying it into effect, are wrong, and should be resisted, as we
were told last night, even unto the dungeon, the gibbet, and the grave? It
only demonstrates to us the necessity of providing all the safeguards, that the

23

wit of man can devise, for the protection of the innocent and the free, at the
same time that we religiously enforce, according to its letter and spirit, every
provision of the Constitution. ) I will not say that the act recently passed for
the surrender of fugitives from labor accomplishes all thij; but I will thank
any gentleman to point out any one barrier against abuse in the old law, or in
the law for the surrender of white men, as fugitives from justice, that is not
secured to the negro under the new law. I pause in order to give any gentle-
man an opportunity to point out the provision. I invite inquiry and examina-
tion. My object is to arrive at the truth — to repel error and dissipate preju-
dice— and to avoid violence and bloodshed. Will any gentleman point out the
provision in the old law, for securing and vindicating the rights of the free man,
that is not secured to him in the act of last session?

[A gentleman present rose and called the attention of Mr. DOUGLAS to the
provision for paying out of the Treasury of the United States the expenses of
carrying the fugitive back in case of anticipated resistance.]

Ah, said Mr. D., that is a question of dollars and cents, involving no other
principle than the costs of the proceeding! I was discussing the question of
human rights — the mode of protecting the rights of freemen from invasion,
and the obligation to surrender fugitives under the Constitution. Is it possible
that this momentous question, which, only forty-eight hours ago, was deemed
of sufficient importance to authorize the city council to nullify an act of Con-
gress, and raise the standard of rebellion against the Federal Government, has
dwindled down into a mere petty dispute, who shall pay the costs of suit?
This is too grave a question for me to discuss on this occasion. I confess my
utter inability to do it justice. Yesterday the Constitution of the ocean-bound
Republic had been overthrown; the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus
had been suspended; the right of trial by jury had been abolished; pains and
penalties had been imposed upon every humane citizen who should feed the
hungry and cover the naked; the law of God had been outraged by an infa-
mous act of a traitorous Congress; and the standard of rebellion, raised by our
city fathers, was floating in the breeze, calling on all good citizens to rally

under its sacred folds, and resist with fire and sword the payment of the

costs of suit upon the arrest of a fugitive from labor!

I will pass over this point, and inquire whether there is any other provision
of this law upon which an explanation is desired? I hope no one will be back-
ward in propounding inquiries, for I have but a few days to remain with you,
and desire to make a clean business of this matter on the present occasion. Is
there any other objection?

[A gentleman rose, and desired to know why the bill provides for paying ten
dollars to the commissioner for his fee in case he decided in favor of the claim-
ant, and only five dollars if he decided against him.]

•24

I presume, said Mr. DOUGLAS, the reason was that he would have more
labor to perform. If, after hearing the testimony, the commissioner decided
in favor of the claimant, the law made it his duty to prepare and authenticate
the necessary papers to authorize him to carry the fugitive home; but if he
decided against him, he had no such labor to perform. The law seems to be
based upon the principle that the commissioner should be paid according to the
service he should render — five dollars for presiding at the trial, and five dollars
for making out the papers in case the testimony should require him to return the
fugitive. This provision appears to be exciting considerable attention in the
country, and I have been exceedingly gratified at the proceedings of a mass
meeting held in a county not far distant, in which it was resolved unanimous-
ly that they could not be bribed, for the sum of five dollars, to consign a free-
man to perpetual bondage! This shows an exalted state of moral feeling,
highly creditable to those who participated in the meeting. I doubt not they
will make their influence felt throughout the State, and will instruct their
members of the legislature to reform our criminal code in this respect. Un-
der our laws, as they have stood for many years, and probably from the organ-
ization of our State government, in all criminal cases, on the preliminary
examination before the magistrates, and in all the higher courts, if the prisoner
be convicted, the witnesses, jurors, and officers are entitled to their fees and
bills of costs; but if he be acquitted, none of them receive a cent. In order to
diffuse the same high moral sense throughout the whole community, would it
not be well, at their next meeting, to pass another resolution, that they would
not be bribed by the fees and costs of suit in any case, either as witnesses,
jurors, magistrates, or in any other capacity, to consign an innocent man to a
dismal cell in the penitentiary, or expose him to an ignominious death upon
the gallows? Such a resolution might do a great deal of good in elevating the
character of our people abroad, at the same time that it might inspire increased
confidence in the liberality and conscientiousness of those who adopted it!

Is there any other objection to this law?

[A gentleman rose, and called the attention of Mr. Douglas to the provision
vesting the appointment of the Commissioners under it in the courts of law,
instead of the President and Senate, and asked if that was not a violation of
that provision of the Constitution which says that Judges of the Supreme
Courts, and of the inferior courts, should be appointed by the President and
Senate.]

I thank the gentleman, said Mr. D., for calling my attention to this point.
It was made in the speech of a distinguished lawyer last night, and evidently pro-
duced great effect upon the minds of the audience. The gentleman's high pro-
fessional standing, taken in connexion with his laborious preparation for the
occasion, as was apparent to all, from his lengthy written brief before him,

25

while speaking, inspired implicit confidence in the correctness of his position.
My answer to the objection will be found in the Constitution itself, which I
will read, so far as it bears upon this question :

" The President shall nominate, and by and with the consent of the Senate,
shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, Judges of the
Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, where appointments
are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law."

Now it will be seen that the words " inferior courts" are not mentioned in
the Constitution. The gentleman in his zeal against the law, and his frenzy
to resist it, interpolated these words, and then made a plausible argument upon
them. I trust this was all unintentional, or was done with the view of fulfil-
ling the " higher law." But there is another sentence in this same clause of
the Constitution which I have not yet read. It is as follows:

" But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers
as they think proper in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
heads of Departments."

The practise under this clause has usually been to confer the power of ap-
pointing those inferior officers, whose duties were executive or ministerial, upon
the President alone, or upon the head of the appropriate department ; and in
like manner to give to the courts of law the privilege of appointing their sub-
ordinates, whose duties were in their nature judicial. What is meant by "in-
ferior officers," whose appointment may be vested in the " courts of law,"
will be seen by reference to the 8th section of the Constitution, where the
powers of Congress are enumerated, and among them is the following :

"To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court."

Is the tribunal which is to carry the fugitive law into effect inferior to the
Supreme Court of the United States ? If it is, the Constitution expressly pro-
vides for vesting the appointment in the courts of law. I will remark, how-
ever, that these commissioners are not appointed under the new law, but in
obedience to an act of Congress which has stood on the statute books for
many years. If those who denounce and misrepresent the act of last session,
had condescended to read it before they undertook to enlighten the people
upon it, they would have saved themselves the mortification of exposure, as I
will show by reading the first section.

Here Mr. DOUGLAS read the law, and proceeded to remark : Thus it will be
seen that these commissioners have been in office for years, with their duties
prescribed by law, nearly all of which were of a judicial character, and that
the new law only imposes additional duties, and authorizes the increase of the
number. Why has not this grave constitutional objection been discovered be-
fore, and the people informed how their rights have been outraged in violation
of the supreme law of the land ? Truly, the passage of the Fugitive bill has
thrown a flood of light upon constitutional principles !

Is there any other objection to the new law which does not apply to the act
of ?93 ?

[A gentleman rose, and said that he would like to ask another question,
which was this: if the new law was so similar to the old one, what was the ne-
cessity of passing any at all, since the old one was still in force ?]

Mr. DOUGLAS, in reply, said, that is the very question I was anxious some
one should propound, because I was desirous of an opportunity of answering
it. The old law answered all the purposes for which it was enacted tolerably
well, until the decision by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case
of Priggs vs. the State of Pennsylvania, eight or nine years ago. That deci-
sion rendered the law comparatively inoperative, for the reason that there was
scarcely any officers left to execute it. It will be recollected that the act of
'93 imposed the duty of carrying it into effect upon the magistrates and other
officers under the State governments. These officers performed their duties
under that law, with fidelity, for about fifty years, until the Supreme Court, in
the case alluded to, decided that they were under no legal obligation to do so,
and that Congress had no constitutional power to impose the duty upon them.
From that time, many of the officers refused to act, and soon afterwards the
legislature of Massachusetts, and many other States, passed laws making it
criminal for their officers to perform these duties. Hence the old law, although
efficient in its provisions, and similar in most respects, and especially in those
now objected to, almost identical with the new law, became comparatively a
dead letter for want of officers to carry it into effect. The judges of the United
States courts were the only officers left who were authorized to execute it.
In this State for instance, Judge Drummond, whose residence was in the ex-
treme northwest corner of the State, within six miles of Wisconsin and three
of Iowa, and in the direction where fugitives were least likely to go, was the
only person authorized to try the case.

If a fugitive was arrested at Shawneetown or Alton, three or four hundred
miles from the residence of the judge, the master would attempt to take him
across the river to his home in Kentucky or Missouri, without first establishing
his right to do so. This was calculated to excite uneasiness and doubts in the
minds of our citizens, as to the propriety of permitting the negro to be carried
out of the State, without the fact of his owing service, and having escaped,
being first proved, lest it might turn out that the negro was a free man and the
claimant a kidnapper. And yet, according to the express terms of the old law,
the master was authorized to seize his slave wherever he found him, and to
carry him back without process, or trial, or proof of any kind whatsoever.
Hence, it was necessary to pass the act of last session, in order to carry into
effect, in a peaceable and orderly manner, the provisions of the law and the
Constitution on the one hand, and to protect the free colored man from being
kidnapped and sold into slavery by unprincipled men on the other hand. The

27

purpose of the new law is to accomplish these two objects — to appoint officers
to carry the law into effect, in the place of the magistrates relieved from that
duty by the decision of the Supreme Court, and to guard against harassing
and kidnapping the free blacks, by preventing the claimant from carrying the
negro out of the State, until he establishes his legal right to do so. The new-
law, therefore, is a great improvement in this respect upon the old one, and is
more favorable to justice and freedom, and better guarded against abuse.

[A person present asked leave to propound another question to Mr. DOUGLAS,
which was this: "If the new law is more favorable to freedom than the old
one, why did the southern slaveholders vote for it, and desire its passage ?"]

Mr. DOUGLAS said he would answer that question with a great deal of pleasure.
The southern members voted for it for the reason that it was a better law than
the old one — better for them, better for us, and better for the free blacks. It
places the execution of the iaw in the hands of responsible officers of the
government, instead of leaving every man to take the law into his own hands
and to execute it for himself. It affords personal security to the claimant
while arresting his servant and taking him back, by providing him with the
opportunity of establishing his legal rights by competent testimony before a
tribunal duly authorized to try the case, and thus allay all apprehensions and
suspicions, on the part of our citizens, that he is a villain, attempting to steal a
free man for the purpose of selling him into slavery. The slaveholder has as
strong a desire to protect the rights of the free black man as we have, and
much more interest to do so; for he well knows, that if outrages should be tol-
erated under the law, and free men are seized and carried into slavery; from
that moment the indignant outcry against it would be so strong here and every-
where, that even a fugitive from labor could not be returned, lest he also might
happen to be free. The interest of the slaveholder, therefore, requires a law
which shall protect the rights of all free men, black or white, from any invasion
or violation whatever. I ask the question, therefore, whether this law is not
better than the old one — better for the North and the South — better for the
peace and quiet of the whole country ? Let it be remembered that this law is
but an amendment to the act of '93, and that the old law still remains in force,
except so far as it is modified by this. Every man who voted against this
modification, thereby voted to leave the old law in force; for I am. not aware
thaKany member of either House of Congress ever had the hardihood to propose
to repe\J the law, and make no provisions for carrying the Constitution into
effect. B^t the cry of repeal, as to the new law, has already gone forth.
Well, suppo\it succeeds; what will those have gained who joined in the shout ?
Have I not sho>n that all the material objections they urge against the new
law, apply with ec|Vd force to the old one ? What do they gain, therefore,
unless they propose t^peal the old law, also, and make no provision for per-
forming our obligations\Ljer the Constitution ? This must be the object of all

28

men who take that position. To this it must come in the end. The
real objection is not to the new law, nor to the old one, but to the Consti-
tution itself. Those of you who hold these opinions, do not mean that the
fugitive from labor shall be taken back. That is the real point of your objec-
tion. You would not care a farthing about the new law, or the old law, or any
other law, or what provisions it contained, if there was a hole in it big enough
for the fugitive to slip through and escape. Habeas corpuses — trials by jury —
records from other States — pains and penalties — the whole catalogue of objec-
tions, would be all moonshine, if the negro was not required to go back to his
master. Tell me, frankly, is not this the true character of your objection ?

[Here several gentlemen gave an affirmative answer.]

Mr. DOUGLAS said he would answer that objection by reading a portion of the
Constitution of the United States. He then read as follows :

" No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof,
escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein,
be discharged from such service or labor, BUT SHALL BE DELIVERED UP on the
claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."

This, said Mr. D., is the supreme law of the land, speaking to every citizen
of the republic. The command is imperative. There is no avoiding — no
escaping the obligation, so long as we live under, and claim the protection of,
the Constitution. We must yield implicit obedience, or we must take the
necessary steps to release ourselves from the obligation to obey. There is no
other alternative. We must stand by the Constitution of the Union, with all its
compromises, or we must abolish it, and resolve each State back into its original
elements. It is, therefore, a question of union or disunion. We cannot
expect our brethren of other States to remain faithful to the compact, and per-
mit us to be faithless. Are we prepared, therefore, to execute faithfully and
honestly the compact our fathers have made for us?

[Here a gentleman rose, and inquired of Mr. DOUGLAS, whether the clause
in the Constitution providing for the surrender of fugitive slaves was not in
violation of the law of God ?]

Mr. 'DOUGLAS in reply — The divine law is appealed to as authority for disre-
garding our most sacred duties to society. The city council have appealed to
it, as their excuse for nullifying an act of Congress; and a committee embodied
the same principle in their resolutions to the meeting in this hall last night, as
applicable both to the Constitution and laws. The general proposition that there
is a law paramount to all human enactments — the law of the Supreme Ruler of
the Universe — I trust that no civilized and Christian people is prepared to
question, much less deny. We should all recognise, respect, and revere the
divine law. But we should bear in mind that the law of God, as revealed to
us, is intended to operate on our consciences, and insure the performance of
our duties as individuals and Christians. The divine law does not prescribe

29

the form of government under which we shall live, and the character of our
political and civil institutions. Revelation has not furnished us with a con-
stitution— a code of international law — and a system of civil and municipal
jurisprudence. It has not determined the right of persons and property —
much less the peculiar privileges which shall be awarded to each class of per-
sons under any particular form of government. God has created man in his
own image, and endowed him with the right of self-government, so soon as he
shall evince the requisite intelligence, virtue, and capacity to assert and enjoy
the privilege. The history of the world furnishes few examples where any
considerable portion of the human race have shown themselves sufficiently
enlightened and civilized to exercise the rights and enjoy the blessings of free-
dom. In Asia and Africa we find nothing but ignorance, superstition, and
despotism. Large portions of Europe and America can scarcely lay claim to
civilization and Christianity; and a still smaller portion have demonstrated their
capacity for self government. Is all this contrary to the laws of God? And
if so, who is responsible? The civilized world have always held, that when
any race of men have shown themselves so degraded, by ignorance, supersti-
tion, cruelty, and barbarism, as to be utterly incapable of governing them-
selves, they must, in the nature of things, be governed by others, by such
laws as are deemed applicable to their condition. It is upon this principle
alone that England justifies the form of government she has established in the
Indies, and for some of her other colonies — that Russia justifies herself in hold-
ing her serfs as slaves, and selling them as a part of the land on which they
live — that our Pilgrim Fathers justified themselves in reducing the negro and
Indian to servitude, and selling them as property — that we, in Illinois and most
of the free States, justify ourselves in denying the negro and the Indian the
privilege of voting, and all other political rights — and that many of the States
of the Union justify themselves in depriving the white man of the right of the
elective franchise, unless he is fortunate enough to own a certain amount of
property.

These things certainly violate the principle of absolute equality among men,
when considered as component parts of a political society or government, and
so do many provisions of the Constitution of the United States, as well as the
several States of the Union. In fact, no government ever existed on earth in
which there was a perfect equality, in all things, among those composing it and
governed by it. Neither sacred nor profane history furnishes an example. If
inequality in the form and principles of government is therefore to be deemed
a violation of the laws of God, and punishable as such, who is to escape?
Under this principle all Christendom is doomed, and no Pagan can hope for
mercy! Many of these things are, in my opinion, unwise and unjust, and, of
course, subversive of Republican principles; but I am not prepared to say that
they are either sanctioned or condemned by the divine law. Who can assert

30

that God has prescribed the form and principles of government, and the char-
acter of the political, municipal, and domestic institutions of men on earth?
This doctrine would annihilate the fundamental principle upon which our
political system rests. Our forefathers held that the people had an inherent
right to establish such Constitution and laws for the government of themselves
and their posterity, as they should deem best calculated to insure the protec-
tion of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and that the same might be
altered and changed as experience should satisfy them to be necessary and
proper. Upon this principle the Constitution of the United States was formed,
and our glorious Union established. All acts of Congress passed in pursuance
of the Constitution are declared to be the supreme laws of the land, and the
Supreme Court of the United States is charged with expounding the same.
All officers and magistrates, under the Federal and State Governments — execu-
tive, legislative, judicial, and ministerial — are required to take an oath to sup-
port the Constitution, before they can enter upon the performance of their
respective duties. Any citizen, therefore, who, in his conscience, believes
that the Constitution of the United States is in violation of a "higher law,"
has no right, as an honest man, to take office under it, or exercise any other
function of citizenship conferred by it. Every person born under the Consti-
tution owes allegiance to it; and every naturalized citizen takes an oath to
support it. Fidelity to the Constitution is the only passport to the enjoyment
of rights under it. When a Senator elect presents his credentials, he is not
allowed to take his seat until he places his hand upon the holy evangelist,
and appeals to his God for the sincerity of his vow to support the Constitution.
He, who does this, with a mental reservation or secret intention to disregard
any provision of the Constitution, commits a double crime — is morally guilty
of perfidy to his God and treason to his country!

If the Constitution of the United States is to be repudiated upon the ground
that it is repugnant to the divine law, where are the friends of freedom and
Christianity to look for another and a better? Who is to be the prophet to
reveal the will of God and establish a Theocracy for us?

Is he to be found in the ranks of northern abolitionism, or of southern dis-
union; or is the common council of the city of Chicago to have the distinguish-
ed honor of furnishing the chosen one? I will not venture to inquire what are
to be the form and principles of the new government, or to whom is to be in-
trusted the execution of its sacred functions; for, when we decide that the
wisdom of our revolutionary fathers was foolishness, and their piety wicked-
ness, and destroy the only system of self government that has ever realized
the hopes of the friends of freedom, and commanded the respect of mankind,
it becomes us to wait patiently until the purposes of the Latter Day Saints
shall be revealed unto us.
(JTor my part, I am prepared to maintain and preserve inviolate the Con-

31

stitution as it is with all its compromises, to stand or fall by the American
Union, clinging with the tenacity of life to all its glorious memories of the
past and previous hopes of the futureT^

Mr. Douglas then explained the circumstances which rendered his absence
unavoidable when the vote was taken on the Fugitive bill in the Senate. He
wished to avoid no responsibility on account of that absence, and therefore de-
sired it to be distinctly understood that he should have voted for the bill if he could
have been present. He referred to several of our most prominent and respect-
ed citizens by name, as personally cognizant of the fact that he was anxious
at that time to give that vote. He believed the passage of that or some other
efficient law a solemn duty, imperatively demanded by the Constitution. In
conclusion, Mr. D. made an earnest appeal to our citizens to rally as one man
to the defence of the Constitution and laws, and above all things, and under
all circumstances, to put down violence and disorder, by maintaining the supre-
macy of the laws. He referred to our high character for law and order here-
tofore, and also to the favorable position of our city for commanding the trade
between the North and South, through our canals and railroads, to show that
our views and principles of action should be broad, liberal, and national, cal-
culated to encourage union and harmony, instead of disunion and sectional
bitterness. He concluded by remarking, that he considered this question of
fidelity to the Constitution and supremacy of the laws, as so far paramount to all
other considerations, that he had prepared some resolutions to cover these
points only, which he would submit to the meeting, and take their judgment
upon them. If he had consulted his own feelings and views only, he should
have embraced in the resolutions a specific approval of all the measures of the
compromise; but as the question of rebellion and resistance to the Federal Go-
vernment has been distinctly presented, it has been thought advisable to meet
that issue on this occasion, distinct and separate from all others.

Mr. Douglas then offered the following resolutions, which were adopted with-
out a dissenting voice :

Resolved, That it is the sacred duty of every friend of the Union to maintain, and preserve
inviolate, every provision of our Federal Constitution.

Resolved, That any law enacted by Congress, in pursuance of the Constitution, should be
respected as such by all good and law-abiding citizens; and should be faithfully carried into
effect by the officers charged with its execution.

Resolved, That so long as the Constitution of the United States provides, that all persons held
to service or labor in one State, escaping into another State, "SHALL BE DELIVERED UP on the
claim of the party to whom the service or labor may be due," and so long as members of Con-
gress are required to take an oath to support the Constitution, it is their solemn and religious
doty to pass all laws necessary to carry that provision of the Constitution into effect.

Resolved, That if we desire to preserve the Union, and render our great Republic inseperable
and perpetual, we must perform all our obligations under the Constitution, at the same time that
we call upon our brethren in other States to yield implicit obedience to it.

Resolved, That as the lives, property, and safety of ourselves and our families depend upon
the observance and protection of the laws, every effort to excite any portion of our population
to make resistance to the due execution of the laws of the land, should be promptly and em-
phatically condemned by every good citizen.

32

Resolved, That we will stand or fall by the American Union and its Constitution, with all its
^compromises, with its glorious memories of the past ani precious hopes of the future.

[The following was offered in addition by B. S. Morris, and also adopted:]

Resolved, That we, the people of Chicago, repudiate the resolutions, passed by the common
council of Chicago, upon the subject of the Fugitive Slave law passed by Congress at its last
session.

On the succeeding night the common council of the city repealed their nulli-
fying resolution by a vote of 12 to 1.

E Douglas, Stephen Arnold

423 Speech of Hon. Stephen A*

D73 Douglas

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